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Long Term Care: The Next Healthcare Frontier
Seth J. Chandler*
The current debate over healthcare reform has
focused on the estimated 36 million persons who
lack health insurance at any point in time.
Deteriorated health does not cause merely a need for
skilled medical services of the sort health insurance
covers; a frequent consequence of deteriorated health
is heightened costs of services variously called
"informal care" or "social care." And a much larger
group of Americans-almost 300 million-continues
to lack insurance to protect them from these
prevalent financial risks, which amount to more than $400 billion annually.1
The need to either socialize the broader set of risks associated with
deteriorated health or to pool them through private "long-term care
insurance" (LTCI) is compelling. With good health, toileting, dressing,
eating, moving around and other behaviors often called "activities of daily
living" (ADLs) are relatively cheap. People generally perform the tasks
themselves with extraordinary efficiency in non-market transactions. Many
illnesses or conditions such as general old age that are not labeled as
"illness" render people unable to perform these tasks themselves. They are
forced either to forego them, further harming their health, or to procure
services in substitute transactions. These substitutes may take place out of
the market in ways that nonetheless create considerable expense such as the
enlisting/dragooning of friends and family. They also take place in the
market through hiring of workers at considerable expense, which in turn
creates significant costs of monitoring performance.
The private insurance market has managed to transfer only a small
portion of these risks. Long term care insurance, which generally
reimburses insureds with more than a specified number of impaired ADLs
* Foundation Professor of Law, Co-Director, Health Law & Policy Institute, University of
Houston Law Center.
1. Market transactions to hire services to help individuals with impaired ADLs that do
not require "skilled" medical care-exceed $200 billion, about the same economic cost of
automobile accidents. Rough estimates of the "cost" of non-market care-what services
would have cost had they been purchased on the market-are on the order of an additional
$250 billion.
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for some portion of the expenses arising therefrom, has now existed in the
United States for over three decades, but is still at most a $15 billion
industry. Fewer than seven million persons in the United States are
currently protected by individual LTCI.
Thus, even as the United States grapples with providing better access to
certain forms of "healthcare," it has not yet succeeded in socializing the risk
of needing long term care nor improving the functioning of a private risk
transfer market. The states likewise have largely failed in this endeavor.
Finance of long term care thus remains very much a frontier, one whose
conquest becomes ever more imperative as the nation's changing age
distribution and the advances of modem medicine collaborate to increase
the number of persons living for long periods of time in need of services to
assist with ADLs.
American governments have, of course, made some efforts in the area.
The Medicaid program pays for long term care at low rates for persons who
are either already paupers or who have "spent down" to become paupers. It
behaves somewhat like an LTCI policy in which the deductible is equal to
most of one's assets and the copay is equal to most of one's income.2 And,
while the amount spent by federal and state governments under the
Medicaid program is high-an estimated $100 billion according to recent
computations-these these payments represent less than half the
materialized risk each year and require individuals often to endure
degrading dependency on a government that saves money by meeting less
than the full needs of the individuals.
The federal government, sometimes working in collaboration with the
states, has created some tax and other incentives to enhance the private
LTCI market. The ambition and success of these provisions in stimulating
the market must be regarded as quite modest and, in some instances
counterproductive. The Internal Revenue Code in section 7702B, for
example, purports to stimulate purchase of "qualified" private LTCI by
conditionally permitting a limited amount of LTCI premiums to be
deducted from income while exempting policy payments from income
taxation.3 The draconian requirements, however, Congress has imposed on
these qualified LTCI policies to prevent them from becoming vehicles of
undesired tax avoidance or deferral have made them unattractive to
sophisticated buyers. The prohibition, for example, on cash surrender
2. Mark R. Meiners & Hunter L. McKay, Private Versus SocialLTC Insurance. Beware
the Comparison, 14 GENERATIONS 32 (1990).
3. LTCI premiums are deductible up to an age-adjusted and inflation adjusted amount,
but only to the extent that those premiums plus those for conventional health insurance
exceed 7.5% of income. Section 9013 of the Senate version of health care reform, passed on
December 24, 2009, would increase the threshold to 10% starting in 2011. H.R. 3590, 11th
Cong. § 9013 (1st Sess. 2009), 155 CONG. REc. S13,891 (2009) (hereinafter Senate bill).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss1/7

2

Chandler: Long Term Care: The Next Healthcare Frontier

2010]

Long Term Care: The Next Healthcare Frontier

values, forces an uninsurable risk of lapse onto policyholders who are
mathematically compelled to overpay for their policies during the early
years relative to actual risk. The prohibition against cash dividends
effectively induces insurers to protect against unforeseen cost increases not
by charging a predictable high premium and paying dividends when costs
remain moderate-the model employed by many life insurance
companies-but by reserving a frightening and not infrequently exercised
unlimited right to raise premiums should costs increase or perhaps merely if
the insurer can just get away with it. And the requirement that two ADLs
be impaired before benefits can be paid forces an incomplete transfer of
risk.
The Long Term Care Partnership program described in section 1917 of
the Social Security Act indirectly stimulates purchase of private LTCI in
participating states by letting owners of these policies qualify for Medicaid
long term care with a greater value of non-exempt assets. But, the program
has had limited success perhaps because there were already ways for the
sophisticated to shelter income and assets, because Medicaid-provided long
term care was sufficiently unattractive that greater access to it proved an
insufficient reward, and because it did essentially nothing to improve the
performance of the private insurance market it intended to stimulate.
Finally, as of this writing, the Senate and House have passed, each as
Title VIII of their mammoth healthcare reform bills, 5 the Community
Living Assistance Services and Supports Act (CLASS). CLASS establishes
a federal LTCJ program available without medical underwriting to those
who have worked for at least three years since purchasing a policy and who
have paid premiums for at least five years. Benefits will range from an
inflation-adjusted $50 up to an administratively determined and inflationadjusted $100 to $300 depending on the number of ADLs impaired. The
program purports to bar use of any external government funds to pay
benefits.
While the proposed CLASS act would create an important outpost on the
long term care frontier, several factors reduce the probability of its long
term success. First, because the federal government reserves the right to
raise premiums on most enrollees should it find those premiums
insufficient, CLASS policies may prove as unattractive as their private
counterparts containing similar provisions. Cynics may see expected low
initial premiums charged by the CLASS program for the first ten years as
4. Stephen A. Moses, The Long-Term Care PartnershipProgram: Why It Failed and
How to Fix It, in WHO WILL PAY FOR LONG TERM CARE.: INSIGHTS FROM THE PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAMS 207 (Nelda McCall ed. 2001).
5. See Senate bill, supra note 3 (Senate bill); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong., (1st Sess. 2009),
155 CONG. REc. H12693 (2009) (House bill). Both these bills amend the Public Health
Service Act.
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simply an accounting slight-of-hand by which the government (a) reduces
the apparent cost of healthcare reform by teasing money from taxpayers
under the guise of an insurance program but (b) fully intends to raise rates
(thereby inducing lapse) when benefits need to be paid as policies mature.
Second, the absence of medical underwriting, while of course a benefit to
those likely to need long term care, poses a significant risk that the
premiums will need to increase beyond expectations and possibly throw the
program into an adverse selection death spiral, particularly as genetic and
medical tests make the individual need for long term care more predictable.
Third, the $50 per day benefit will prove inadequate to cover most of the
expenses of many persons needing long term care and will thus have only
slightly diminished the need either to repair private LTCI markets or
socialize the remaining risk.
A number of steps, however, could make the private market more robust.
To repeat many prior cries in the wilderness, private LTCI policies remain
stunningly difficult to understand and yet more difficult to compare.
Numerous studies report widespread consumer ignorance and confusion
about the contents of long term care policies. In most states, insurance
companies are largely free to include as many complex features in their
policies as they wish; few have attempted creating any standards as, for
example, exist with Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Medigap) in which
elderly consumers sacrifices the benefits of complete customization in favor
of a limited menu of comparable policies. Although the health reform bills
currently pending in Congress may create "health insurance exchanges" that
are touted as increasing the transparency of conventional health insurance
purchasing, neither of the proposals extend the exchanges to LTCI. Nor are
there presently any readily available calculators that would permit a 52 year
old male in good health to determine or even approximate the actuarially
fair price of a long term care policy with a 6 month waiting period, $250
per day of benefits with 4% compound inflation or to compare the value
provided by that policy to one with a three month waiting period, $200 per
day of benefits and 3% compound inflation.
Little has been done at either the federal or state levels to address the
difficulty private insurers have of actually writing LTCI where the scope
and magnitude of future risks are so difficult to discern. LTCI is not like its
much older cousin, life insurance where risks are now modeled well enough
that regulators can fairly well determine the adequacy of premiums. LTCI,
by contrast, is in its actuarial infancy. Neither governments nor private
bodies have been keeping statistics for centuries about ADL impairmentand certainly not on the weekly basis needed to model contemporary LTCI
policies. And, critically, as discussed further below, the dynamics of
medicine, the difficulty of predicting how LTCI will coordinate with public
insurance schemes, and the difficulty of predicting the meaning of
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss1/7
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contractual terms about "activities of daily living" make it extraordinarily
difficult to use limited past statistics and actuarial models to make the
needed predictions benefit obligations thirty and forty years hence,
particularly where the LTCI policies contain complex features such as "bed
reservation" benefits cover more than one person. The efflorescence of
long term care risk created by the recent advances in medicine and changes
in family mores has given rise to a premature birth of long term care
insurance.
The inability of regulators to accurately assess LTCI pricing has serious
consequences for the ability of a for-profit market to flourish. If state
insurance regulators place too high a floor on LTCI pricing, the product is
almost fatally unattractive and vulnerable to being undercut if federally
sponsored insurance such as CLASS comes to pass. If insurance regulators
place too low a floor on pricing, however, and individuals are as unable as
regulators to discern a reasonable price, clever or self-deceived insurers can
capture the market by selling cut rate policies. These insurers then either
externalize the insolvency risk substantially on policyholders and state
guarantee funds or hurt policyholders and increase lapse rates by raising
premiums years after the policy has been issued. Indeed, such rate
increases are almost invited by current "contingent non-forfeiture" laws that
generally permit long term care insurers to raise premiums by up to 200%
without any adverse consequence. These laws further permit insurers who
raise rates beyond the "caps"-e.g. a 300% increase-to expropriate wealth
from the policyholder by giving those who refuse to pay the higher
premiums a policy with a maximum benefit that is no longer the
contractually negotiated amount but only the generally lower amount of
premiums thus far paid in. 6
Third, little has been done at the federal or state level to remove the
severe problem of lapse risk that plagues current LTCI policies and renders
them unattractive to knowledgeable purchasers. As it stands, potential
LTCI purchasers face a dilemma. They can always wait until they are
reasonably sure they will have enough money to pay the premiums and they
are sure that the insurance company has an accurate enough model of
benefits that it will not need to raise premiums. These prospective insureds
minimize lapse risk but (a) pay high premiums; (b) incur the risk of
"premature" long term care; and (c) incur the risk of becoming
"uninsurable" while they are deferring purchase. Prospective insureds can
buy a policy when they are relatively young and reduce these downsides of
deferred purchase but in doing so run two risks that the policy will not be in
6. See Seth J. Chandler, Modeling Long Term Care Insurance, available at
http://library.wolfram.com/infocenter/Conferences/7442/,
(last visited Dec. 31, 2009)
(containing presentations and links to related materials)
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force when needed. Unless these "early adopters" are among the very few
who purchase non-forfeiture benefits at considerable expense, they face a
heightened risk that a time will come when adverse financial developments
(including divorce) will force them to let a yet-not-paid-up policy lapse. If
lapse indeed occurs, the policyholder will have grossly overpaid for the
policy in the same way lapsing life insurance policyholders overpay when
statutory "non-forfeiture" laws are not in effect. Moreover, there is
substantial risk that the insurer will go insolvent during a 50 year time span
between purchase of a policy and the time when it must pay benefits of
uncertain magnitude.
Just as those advocating substantial healthcare reform in recent years
have pointed to the apparently greater success of other nations in both
curbing costs and improving access, so too may they contrast other nation's
success in providing long term care with the failings of the United States.
The fundamental problem faced by the United States (and the rest of the
world) in developing either a private LTCI market or creating a public one
is, curiously, one of medical advance. Insurance works best when the
pooled risks are uncorrelated such that the occurrence of an insured event
befalling one insured or even a group of insureds conveys little information
about the likelihood or magnitude of a covered event befalling another
insured or group of insureds. The unpredictability of medical advances and
the dependency of long term care benefits on it mean that the law of large
numbers does not apply as well to long term care as to many other forms of
insurance. Medical advances enhancing longevity can created a typhoon of
long term care needs. Cures for Alzheimer's disease or abilities to reverse
the effects of stroke can, on the other hand, reduce the need for long term
care. And no one today can say which effect will predominate.
Problems with an insurance market are, of course, no obstacle to the
government provision of long term care. Government can always view
long term care as a form of welfare. But if the recent debates about
conventional healthcare reform prove anything it is that, unlike some but
not all industrial democracies, 7 we are a long way from mass socialization
of long term care risk or even conceiving that unmitigated longevity could
have adverse consequences. Until those conceptions change, we face a
hostile though not impossible frontier of trying to improve an LTCI market
that enhances the dignity and function of persons whose health no longer
permits them to perform the activities of daily living.
7. See John Creighton Campbell & Naomi Ikegami, Long-Term Care Insurance Comes
to Japan, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 26 (2000); Allison Evans Cuellar & Joshua M. Wiener, Can
Social Insurance For Long-Term Care Work? The Experience of Germany, 19 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 8 (2000); AARP International, European Experiences with Long-Term Care,
available at http://www.aarpinternational.org/usr doc/ldrstudylongterm_030507.pdf , last
visited Dec. 31, 2009 (October 2006 AARP European Leadership Study).
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